Abstract-This paper considers a delay tolerant network consisting of nodes equipped with sensors, some of them producing outliers. A distributed faulty node detection (DFD) algorithm, whose aim is to help each node in estimating the status of its sensors, has been proposed recently by the authors. The aim of this paper is to analyze the robustness of the DFD algorithm to the presence of misbehaving nodes performing Byzantine attacks. Two types of attacks are considered and analyzed, each trying to mislead the other nodes in the estimation of the status of their sensors. This provides insights on the way the parameters of the DFD algorithm should be adapted to minimize the impact of misbehaving nodes. Theoretical results are illustrated with simulations considering nodes with random displacements, as well as traces of node inter-contact times from real databases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) refer to the challenging situation of networks operating with intermittent connectivity [1] . This happens, for example, in Vehicular DTNs [2] , where the nodes are moving vehicles and communication is established only between closely located agents. This produces frequent link disruptions and network topology reconfiguration. This time-varying nature exposes DTNs to infiltrations by potentially malicious nodes, who may attempt to perturb the DTN behavior. Threatens against the DTN integrity may come in the form of malware attacks [3] , selfish behavior of nodes [4] , Byzantine attacks [5] , [6] , and so on. The absence of a central unit able to act as a certifying authority makes trust management in DTNs very difficult.
In this paper we consider a DTN where nodes are equipped with sensors, collecting data used, e.g., to estimate some physical phenomenon. We assume that the network behavior is perturbed by nodes with defective sensors and by nodes performing Byzantine attacks.
A sensor is called defective if it frequently reports erroneous measurements. This phenomenon may be due, e.g., to the degradation of the equipment in time. The identification of nodes equipped with defective sensors is very important to save communication resources and to prevent erroneous measurements to pollute the estimates provided by the DTN. Distributed fault detection (DFD) is a well-investigated topic in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), see [7] - [9] and references therein. The WSNs considered in the literature are usually dense and have a static topology. DFD in DTNs is made more challenging by the sparse and dynamic topology, and is much less investigated. The authors proposed in [10] a fully distributed and easily implementable algorithm allowing each node of a DTN to determine whether its own sensors are defective.
A basic assumption in [10] is that all the nodes in the DTN may not be misbehaving in other ways than carrying defective sensors. This paper investigates the performance of the DFD algorithm when the DTN is under Byzantine attack, i.e., several nodes are fully controlled by an adversary. While the normal nodes perform the DFD algorithm to determine the status of their own sensors, the Byzantine nodes try to prevent the correct self-evaluation of normal nodes. This work aims to determine i) whether the DFD algorithm proposed in [10] is robust against the introduction of Byzantine nodes; ii) how to adjust the algorithm parameters to minimize the effects of the Byzantine attack. To answer these questions we extend the analysis in [10] by taking into account a proportion of Byzantine nodes. Theoretical predictions are supported by simulation results obtained by using both an idealized node displacement model and traces from real databases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model and the basic assumptions. Section III details the DFD algorithm for DTNs and introduces the Byzantine attack model. Section IV discusses the dynamics of different nodes during the DFD algorithm. Section V analyzes the property of the equilibrium obtained from the state equations and discusses the choice of the parameters in the algorithm. Section VI provides numerical results and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a set S of moving nodes equipped with sensors. Assume that a subset B ⊂ S of these nodes are controlled by an adversary and perform a Byzantine attack to disturb the behavior of the network. The nodes in the set N = S \ B are normal. Let D ⊂ N denote the subset of nodes which are not malicious but produce outliers due to their defective sensors. The outliers are measurements having statistical characteristics significantly different from normal measurements provided by good sensors. As a consequence, the status of Node i has three possible values θ i (t) ∈ Θ = {0, 1, 2}, i.e.,
In this paper, one assumes that the status of nodes remains constant during the algorithm, i.e., θ i (t) = θ i , and that the nodes are initially not aware of their status and only nodes in N are willing to estimate their status. Let p θ be the proportion of nodes with status θ ∈ Θ, with p 0 + p 1 + p 2 = 1.
Nodes can exchange information only during the limited time interval in which they are in vicinity. As in [10] , nodes are assumed to be well-mixed and the time interval between two successive meetings of a given node is assumed to follow an exponential distribution with an inter-contact rate λ [11] . Moreover, one assumes that each meeting involves only two nodes. When more than two nodes meet at the same time instant, processing is performed pair-by-pair.
During each meeting of a pair of nodes (i, j) ∈ S each node senses data m . with their own sensors and then may exchange these data. If Node i has received the data from Node j (i.e., m j ), then a local outlier detection test (LODT) can be performed by Node i with outcome y ij . Assume that the spatial and temporal correlation between data is such that only data sensed during the meeting of two nodes can be exploited by a LODT. Therefore, previously collected data are not exploited. The LODT yields y ij = 1 if it detects the presence of at least an outlier among the data m i and m j , and y ij = 0 otherwise. The LODT is not able to determine which sensor is producing outliers. Such situation occurs for example, when comparing few scalar measurements of the same physical quantity. The presence of an outlier is easily detected when the measurements are very different. Nevertheless, even if the difference is large, it is difficult to determine which measurement is an outlier.
LODTs can take various forms, see [9] . In this paper, the LODT is characterized by the probabilities q θiθj = P {Y i,j = 1 | θ i , θ j }, with θ i ∈ Θ and θ j ∈ Θ. For example, q 00 is the probability that an outlier is detected when data are provided by good sensors. One has q θiθj = q θj θi as y ij = y ji . One further assumes that q 00 < q 01 = q 10 q 11 , which is reasonable, since the outcome of a LODT is more likely to be 1 as the number of outliers involved increases.
The properties of LODTs when a malicious node is involved will be further discussed in Section III-B.
III. DFD ALGORITHM SUBJECT TO BYZANTINE ATTACKS
This section recalls the DFD algorithm presented in [10] and then discusses the behavior of misbehaving nodes.
A. DFD algorithm
In the DFD algorithm [10] , each node manages two counters 
Only the nodes with θ (t) = 0 can send their data to the nodes met at time t. Each node performs a LODT and updates its counters only when it has received some data from another node. For example, assume that Node i with θ i (t) = 1 meets Node j at time t. Node i still takes measurements, but it does not send these data to Node j. If θ j (t) = 0, then Node i can receive the data from Node j and perform a LODT.
To simplify the analysis, one has chosen to consider the evolution of c m,i (t) and c d,i (t) over a sliding time window containing the time instants of the last M meetings during which Node i has performed a LODT. Algorithm 1 summarizes the proposed DFD technique for an arbitrary normal Node i ∈ N .
Algorithm 1 Sliding-Window DFD algorithm for Node i ∈ N .
1) Initialize t
, and t = t + δt until the ι-th meeting occurs at time t
B. Byzantine attack
To disturb the behavior of Algorithm 1, a Byzantine Node b may set θ b (t) = 0, ∀t 0, so that it always indicates to the encountered nodes that it is well behaving and that it trusts its sensors. Then Node b may transmit some artificial data to mislead the other nodes. Two types of behavior are considered in what follows.
B1) Node b always transmits random quantities to the encountered nodes. These random data are usually outliers. Therefore, q 20 and q 21 are close to 1. 
A. Transition probabilities
Define π δm,δd θ as the transition probability from State (θ, , k)
In case where c m,i (t) = < M, the counter c m,i (t) either increases or remains constant, thus
The only possibility leading to δ m = 0 is that Node J is not a Byzantine node and θ J (t) = 1. Therefore, for any θ ∈ {0, 1},
where p θ = P {θ J = θ} by the assumption that the nodes are well mixed. One introduces
which is the proportion of agents with status θ believing their status is θ. Notice that p θ θ (t) can be obtained from X ,k θ (t) according to the decision rule (2), i.e.,
A state transition occurs with (δ m , δ d ) = (1, 1) when Node i with status θ i = θ meets Node J with θ J (t) = 0 and when the LODT yields y i (t) = 1. The two events are independent, hence
Since the Byzantine nodes with θ b = 2 always indicate θ b = 0, one may rewrite (6) as
Finally, π
In the case where c m,i (t) = M , one has δ m = 0 as the counter c m,i (t) reaches its maximum value. In Algo-
. This event represents a situation where one knows that k LODTs were positive among the last M tests and the old LODT outcome that will be discarded once the new LODT outcome is available, also concluded in the presence of defective sensors. As discussed in [10] , one has P {E 1 (t)} ≈ k/M and
Assume that the (μ −
To have (δ m , δ d ) = (0, 1), three independent events have to occur: 1) the encountered Node J has θ J (t) = 0; 2) y i (t) = 1; 3) y i t = 0, i.e., E 0 (t). The transition probability is then deduced using derivations similar to (6),
Consider then (δ m , δ d ) = (0, −1), similarly, one obtains, 
B. Macroscopic evolution
With the transition probabilities discussed in Section IV-A and the initial conditions 
otherwise, then for any θ ∈ {0, 1}, one has
where (a) describes the evolution of the proportion of state components in the transient regime and (b) is for the permanent regime.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we investigate the asymptotic behavior of the DTN state equations (11) . Algorithm 1 may drive X ,k θ to an equilibrium X ,k θ at which the proportions of nodes in different states X ,k θ (t) do not vary any more. As a consequence, p θ0 (t) defined in (5) also tends to an equilibrium p θ0 .
A. Equilibrium of X ,k θ
The results presented in this section are the extension of those in [10] by considering the affect of Byzantine attack.
Proposition 1.
Assume that the dynamic system described by (11) admits some equilibrium X ,k θ , then p = p 00 , p 10 is the solution of (14) (at the top of the next page) and for any θ ∈ {0, 1} and k ,
where
Proposition (1) can be proved using derivations similar to those presented in [10] . Proposition (1) provides non-linear equations (14) that have to be satisfied by p. With the solutions of (14), the values of X M,k θ at equilibrium can be easily deduced.
B. Approximations of the Equilibrium
Closed-form expressions for p 00 and p 10 are difficult to obtain from (14). This section introduces an approximation of (14) from which some insights may be obtained on the way ν should be chosen to minimize the impact of the presence of misbehaving nodes.
Since both p 10 
Therefore, (14) may be rewritten as from which one deduces the approximate values X
(17) The quality of the approximation can be verified by checking whether there exists some value of ν that leads to both Figure 1 is also helpful to choose the value of ν in order to meet different performance requirements.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section provides simulation results to illustrate the theoretical results presented in Section V. The results presented in Section VI-A are obtained considering nodes with an idealized displacement model. Some real databases are then considered in Section VI-B.
A. Idealized displacement model
Consider a DTN consisting of 1000 moving nodes, with their initial positions uniformly distributed over a unit square. Nodes randomly move within this square. Two nodes communicate only when their distance is less than their communication range r 0 at discrete time instants kΔt, k = 1, 2 . . . . One assumes an idealized displacement model: the location of each agent at time (k + 1) t is independent of its previous location at time kΔt. The value of r 0 can be chosen to adjust the inter-contact probability during a time interval of duration Δt. Here, the inter-contact probability is taken as 0. should be as separate as possible. The main influence of the Byzantine attack is that it makes the two distributions closer. Nevertheless, the DFD algorithm still behaves in a satisfying way if the parameter ν is properly chosen using (14): in the simulations both p 01 and p 10 can be made less then 1%. 
B. Simulation with real databases
In this section, the DFD algorithm is executed considering node inter-contact times taken from real databases provided by the Haggle Project [12] and by our own experiments conducted at the EuWin platform at University of Bologna. In the simulation, one is interested in the inter-contact trace, i.e., which pair of agents have a meeting at which time. We use the following databases:
• Infocom05, in which N = 41, lasted 3 days.
• Bologna16, in which N = 34, during the break of a course (which lasts about 17 minutes). (reflected by the density of points in the sub-figures at the top): using Infocom05, variations are significant at beginning of working hours; using Bologna16, p 10 and p 01 decrease significantly in the end as all the students came back to the class. Figure 5 represents the proportion of nodes in each state X M,k θ in the end of the simulation, obtained by using the databases Infocom05 and Bologna16. The simulation results are compared with the approximation (17). One still finds that there is a good match by using the databases.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the impact of Byzantine attacks on the performance of a distributed faulty node detection algorithm in the context of delay tolerant networks. The aim of the algorithm is to make each normal node estimate the status of its own sensors, whereas some Byzantine nodes attempt to mislead the behavior of the algorithm. The affect of Byzantine attack on the equilibrium is analyzed theoretically, which is helpful to adjust the algorithm parameters in order to ensure the robustness of the DFD algorithm. Both ideal movement model and real databases have been considered in the simulations to illustrate our results.
